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I. INTRODUCTION
"Without work all life goes rotten. But when work is soulless life stifles and
dies."
Albert Camus (1913-1960)1
'The study upon which we have been engaged [the history of the common law]
is necessary both for the knowledge and for the revision of the law."
0. W. Holmes, Jr. (1841-1935)2
1. GEORGES FRIEDAANN, THE ANATOMiy OF WORK: LABOR, LEIsURE AND THE IMPLICA-
TIONS OF AUTOMATION viii (Wyatt Rawson trans. 1961) (citing Camus in
Foreword).
2. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 36 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard
Univ. Press 1963) (1881). Holmes believed that 'it]he life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience." Id. at 1. Judicially, he later made the same point
in more memorable terms: "Upon this point a page of history is worth a volume of
logic." New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
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'The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."
William 0. Douglas (1898-1980)3
A nation of approximately 260 million Americans manifests a rich
diversity of values and attitudes toward work. Some observers have
suggested that attitudes toward work can be accurately classified
along class lines or by the color of the worker's collar. 4 Many people in
the United States view work as an important activity; and, unlike the
Biblical5 or predominant Greek view, work is not merely tolerated as a
curse. If anything, the lack of work or unemployment is the modern
curse.
6
The work ethic and secular Calvinism are still endorsed by most
people in the United States, but it is probably accurate to say that the
Reagan-Bush years witnessed a small boom in the once discredited
notion that a person's worth may be measured by his or her wealth.
Ostentatious displays of wealth are once again fashionable in certain
Washington, DC circles. 7 A discouraging increase in the negative but
related sentiment that poor people are lazy or otherwise undeserving
of wealth often accompanies such a fashion swing.8 A better reasoned
position might be to praise wealth so long as it is the product of honest
labor and also recognize the importance of compassion.
Americans often see their identity and self concepts intertwined in
their work. 9 Many, if not most, want their work to be interesting,
3. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (citation omitted).
4. See, e.g., HANNAH ARmNDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 77-88 (1958); SEBASTIAN DE
GRAziA, OF TIME, WoR, AND LEIsuRE 40 (1962).
5. Genesis 3:17-19.
6. See, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN woRK DisAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE
NEW URBAN POOR (1996); see also JEREMY RiFKun, THE END OF Wo= THE DE-
CLINE OF THE GLOBAL LABOR FORCE AND THE DAWN OF THE POsT-MARK=T ERA
(1995).
7. See, e.g., WIIAM H. SHAw, BusmaEss ETHICS 83 (3d ed. 1999) (detailing Presi-
dent Reagan's "tax breaks for the rich").
8. Adam Smith said it best:
This disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the pow-
erful, and to despise, or, at least to neglect persons of poor and mean
condition, though necessary both to establish and to maintain the dis-
tinction of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same time, the great
and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments.
That wealth and greatness are often regarded with the respect and ad-
miration which are due only to wisdom and virtue; and that the con-
tempt, of which vice and folly are the only proper objects, is often most
unjustly bestowed upon poverty and weakness, has been the complaint
of moralists in all ages.
ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS § 1I, Chapter 3 (1759).
9. A 1% rise in unemployment in the United States is associated with an increase in
suicides of over 4% and an increase in homicides of over 5%. THE IDAHO STATES-
MAN, Dec. 23, 1998, at 3E; see also Angelo Kinicki et al., Socially Responsible
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challenging, and satisfying.10 This aspect of the American character
provides and will continue to provide serious challenges for managers.
Similarly, many workers in the United States-because they see their
self-worth tied up in their calling, to use the Calvinist term-are sensi-
tive to wage issues and other conditions of employment. Employment
is the central economic relation for every worker. Consequently, much
weight attaches to it.
Employment is as central now to an individual's status and ability
to survive as the rights to land were 600 years ago in England and
Western Europe. In that agrarian society, land was central; all else
could be reproduced if one had the right to a sufficient quantity of real
estate. The result was that the kings, parliaments, and courts erected
an elaborate social and legal system to protect and delineate rights in
land. In a famous dictum, Sir Henry Maine argued that the progress
of societies has been the movement from status to contract.' He
probably meant that law had moved from the feudal notion of rights
inhering in status to notions of contract and property. One major shift
in Anglo-American law came when the emphasis on property and con-
tract was displaced by a new concern for human rights.12
In this paper, we focus on privacy in employment, an emerging but
disputed claim made on behalf of workers who resent being monitored,
photographed,'s and searched in their places of employment and, usu-
ally, as a condition of employment. However, our underlying belief is
that the fundamental changes in society away from agrarian to a post-
industrial society demand a fundamental shift in laws, ethics, morals,
and customs to protect and delineate the rights of workers in their
Plant Closings, PERSONNEL ADIIN., June 1987, at 116 (citing BARRY BLUESTONE
& BENNETr HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA (1982)).
10. See, e.g., HAROLD L. SHEPPARD & NEiL Q. HEmucm, WHmR HAVE ALL THE ROBOTS
GONE? WORKER DISSATISFACTION IN THE '70s 10-11 (1972) (citing a University of
Michigan study). The Michigan study asked workers to rank the importance of
25 aspects of work. The top seven in order ofimportance were: interesting work;
enough help and equipment to get the job done; enough information to get the job
done; enough authority to do the job; good pay; opportunity to develop special
abilities; and job security.
11. Sm HENRY MAIE, ANcIENT LAW 168-70 (1901), quoted in HAROLD J. BERMAN &
WmLmm R. GRIENER, THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF LAw 752 (4th ed. 1980).
12. Certainly, this is not to imply that there have not been other major shifts in An-
glo-American jurisprudence over the centuries.
13. For examples of abusive uses of miniature surveillance cameras, see Eric Fidler,
Smile You're On... Tiny Cameras Can Invade Your Life and Put It On Public
Display, THE SPoKE slA-REviw, Aug. 30, 1999, at A9. Fidler discusses some of
the more outrageous uses of the new low-cost snooping devices. In one situation,
28 plaintiffs filed suit in Cook County Circuit Court in July 1999 against the
makers and distributors of videotapes that were made surreptitiously in locker
rooms at Northwestern University, Eastern Illinois, Illinois State and University




employment relations. Perhaps, the time has come to dispense with
the discredited notion of employment at will 14 and to replace it with a
new approach to employment in which workers' human dignity, job
security, and health are paramount.'5
This paper will address the hypothesis that a breakdown in civil
society has created a void that the emerging law of workplace privacy
is attempting to fill. Establishing an increase in incivility in United
States society since 1945 cannot be done with scientific accuracy.16
We will argue for the increase of incivility using anecdotal evidence,
opinions of social observers, and data from selected proxies for incivil-
ity such as divorce, crime rates, and arrests.
A former frontrunner for the GOP Presidential nomination, Eliza-
beth Dole, listed as one of her top priorities the elimination of incivil-
ity in public life and in the United States Congress.17 Even
traditional patterns of etiquette are in decline. Under older formal
notions and standards of civility, a "gentleman would avert his eyes" if
a lady accidentally displayed more ankle than was deemed seemly.
Many of us were taught not to "eavesdrop" on the conversations of
others either over a party telephone line or in an adjoining room of the
home. These traditional notions of civility, respect and decency were
carried into the American workplace. Now, we seem to have, as a ma-
jority, moved toward a much looser, informal standard of civility, one
that in the Western states allows cowboy hats and blue jeans at the
Philharmonic as well as at the Governor's Inaugural Ball. As Boy
Scouts, we were schooled to be friendly, courteous, and kind.18 We
14. Deborah A. Ballam, The Traditional View of the Origins of The Employment-At-
Will Doctrine: Myth or Reality?, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 48-49 (1995).
15. See, e.g., Norm Bowie, Challenging the Egoistic Paradigm, 1 Bus. ETmIcs Q. 1,19
(1992). Professor Bowie argues that the underlying reason for corporations is,
contrary to Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman's stance of profit maximization, to
provide meaningful employment to its workers. This philosophy might well un-
derpin a federal workers' bill of rights some day.
16. See MARK CALDWELL, A SHORT HISTORY OF RUDENESS: MANNERS, MORALS, AND
MIsBEHAVIOR rN MODERN AMERiCA (1999) for an excellent book-length treatise on
the causes of the decline of civility in the United States. Caldwell presents a
history of the decline of manners. He argues that we have become obsessed with
the perceived decline of civility in recent years, but that the actual history of the
erosion of etiquette can be traced back several centuries to the blurring of class
distinctions and the rise of a new middle class.
17. William Saletan, A Tale of Two Liddys, MOTHER JONES, May-June 1999, at 29.
Saletan writes "[Elizabeth Dole's] ingenious solution is to make congressional in-
civility in both parties a moral issue. America faces a plague of'crime, violence,
drugs, illegitimacy, and incivility,' she declares. 'If public life is lacking in civil-
ity, then it is our common task to help civilize it.'"
18. While growing up in Milwaukee, I (Wines writes) was a Boy Scout from 1956-
1958. I went back to my old HANDBOOK FOR Boys (B.S-.A, 5th ed. 1951) to check
out the Scout Law that lists 12 virtues for boys. A Boy Scout is trustworthy,
loyal, helpful, friendly, courteous, kind, obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave, clean,
and reverent. See id. at 26-27.
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were taught to hold doors open for women, to walk on the curbside
when escorting a female companion, to hold chairs for ladies to be
seated, and to remove caps and hats when indoors. Alas, chivalry
died. Older, more formal standards of civility have retreated in the
face of charges of sexism and elitism. In some instances, good man-
ners have been annihilated by social turmoil. In part, this is one of
the social legacies of the 1960s.
Although some critics argue it might take "700 pages" to make
such an argument,19 the next section will attempt to summarize argu-
ments both anecdotal and statistical for the decline in civility in
United States society since the Second World War.
II. A SUMMARY ARGUMENT FOR THE DECLINE OF CIVIL
SOCIETY IN THE UNITED STATES
The traditional role of "good manners" in a society is to ease poten-
tial friction between members of the society by providing norms of re-
spect and deference that ease social interactions. As indicated in the
introduction, the decline of civility norms20 has left a vacuum in areas
Thinking that it might be informative to see what the new Boy Scout Hand-
book looked like, I ordered one. THE Boy ScouT HANDBOOK (B.SA. 11th ed.
1998), opens with a 21 page treatise on child abuse entitled, How To Protect Your
Children From Child Abuse: A Parent's Guide. Id. at 1-21. For contrast, the old
HANDBOOK opens with a title and copyright page, a short history of the HAND-
BOOK, a Table of Contents, an essay entitled Fun and Adventure in Scouting illus-
trated with outdoor sketches, and Part I on How to Become a Scout. HANDBOOK
FOR Boys, supra, at 1-97.
The contrast between these editions of handbooks speaks volumes about the
changing nature of American society. The rise of genuine criminal incivility that
necessitated the changes is chilling.
19. Comments by Tom Dunfee, Kolodny Professor of Social Responsibility, Depart-
ment of Legal Studies, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, made on
February 20, 1999 at the presentation of an earlier version of this paper by Pro-
fessor Wines.
20. When I was a boy (Wines writes), my father cautioned me frequently "to be a good
sport," not to object to referee's decisions that were adverse to my team, to respect
my opponent, and to be humble in victory and gracious in defeat. Many Ameri-
cans now are not only bad losers but also bad winners.
An example of bad-winners can be seen in NFL Football. Denver Bronco fans
had various confrontations and assaulted Oakland Raider football players after a
Bronco overtime victory. See Mile High Madness: Snowball Fight Pits Raiders
Against Bronco Fans, THE SPoKEsAsN-REviEw, Nov. 24, 1999, at C2. Some
Raider players were targets of snowballs that had batteries embedded in them.
See id. One Raider was charged with battery, and another was not charged when
he hit a fan in self-defense. See id.
Even the sport of golf, usually noted for decorum and a high level of etiquette,
has been hit by declining levels of civility. See Kevin Paul DuPont (Boston
Globe), Antics Shock Euros: Taunts toward Montgomerie, Green Display Leave
Bad Taste," THE SPoKEsAN-REviEw, Sept. 27, 1999, at C7; Jack Saylor, Fate
Fuels Great U.S. Comeback, Yanks Reclaim Ryder Cup After Rallying Just in
Time, TnE SPoKEsIrAN-REviEw, Sept. 27, 1999, at C1. These articles are about
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previously covered by etiquette.2 1 I do not wish to argue the merits of
this social change but merely to argue that it has occurred almost en-
tirely since the end of the Second World War (1945) and principally
since 1960.22 Some social changes involved elimination of the double
standard (and the pedestal) for women. Some of the etiquette was
outdated and in some places it was silent. For instance, there was
very little in social norms dealing with men and women working to-
gether on the same job as equals; neither was there much to be said
about e-mail and drug testing. However, social upheaval also elimi-
nated some courtesies 2 3 that would have eased some of the current
problems the law is attempting to confront as it moves into the privacy
arena.
One social commentator has declared that "[i]n some ways, we
have become a numb society. Today almost anything seems endura-
ble, inevitable, or unscotchable .... Nothing seems offensive any
longer in a constitutional sense."2 4 Even the perennially upbeat Ann
Landers wrote in her Christmas column, "I am firmly against censor-
ship, but where is the moral outrage against all the filth? It's almost
the story of the American Ryder Cup Team making the greatest comeback in the
history of the series and ending six years of European domination. Thirty-thou-
sand American fans "sounded more like a college football crowd as the usually
sedate [Brookline] Country Club erupted with every European ebb and American
flow." Saylor, supra, at C7. "The U.S. team, said [Spain's Jose Maria] Olazabal
should have been more mindful of golf etiquette and some fans should be
ashamed of the words that came out of their mouths. 'Cheer for your team all you
want,' said Olazabal .... Just show respect for your opponent.'" DuPont, supra,
at C7.
21. See, e.g., Christina Duff, It's My Party, I'll Cry If l Want to, Cry if l Want to, Cry if
I... , WALL ST. J., June 18, 1998, at Al. Duff writes that the use of R.S.V.P.
[respondez, s'il vous plait] arose about 25 years ago when people stopped auto-
matically writing notes to acknowledge invitations. Now, there is an epidemic of
party goers not even responding to the R.S.V.P. Miss Manners, the nom de
plume of etiquette umpire Judith Martin, says "[p]arty givers should wake up
and realize that there is 'simply no recognition any more of hospitality as a social
contract between guests and hosts.'" Id. Etiquette, morals, and ethics can and
usually are distinquished. When we talk about the decline of civil society, in a
general sense we are talking about the decline of civility which encompasses all
three.
22. See, e.g., H. RAP BROWN, Dm NIGGER DiE (1969); TOM HAYDEN, TRIAL (1970); AB-
BIE HOFFMAN, STEAL THis BOOK (1971); WLiAM M. KuNSTLER, My LIE AS A RAD-
iCAL LAWYER (1994); JERRY RUBIN, Do IT (1970).
23. See THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (visited Oct. 20, 1998) <http'J/daily@chronicle.
com>, which published the following item: "MORE EVIDENCE of rising incivility
for professors: Last week a faculty member at the University of Maryland at Col-
lege Park reported being threatened with a gun by a student who wanted an A in
one of the professor's mathematics classes." Id. Note assault with a deadly
weapon is now being lumped with "incivility." As a nation, we have become very
insensitive to violence.
24. LEONARD W. LEvY, BLAsPHEMY: VERBAL OFFENSE AGAINST THE SACRED, FROM
MOSES TO SALmAN RUSHDIE 569 (1993).
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impossible to find a family movie these days. What has happened to
plain, everyday decency?" 2 5
Crime statistics are up2 6 while trust levels have dropped in the
United States since 1968, a watershed year in American social his-
tory.2 7 In 1968, polls showed a dramatic decline in American confi-
dence in virtually all of our social institutions.28 Although there was a
small increase in trust/confidence during the Reagan administration,
the levels of trust have not since risen anywhere near the high pre-
1968 levels.
In 1990 in the United States, the divorce rate hit 50%.29 Other
studies indicate that one-third of all marriages now breakup in less
than four years, and a child in the 1990s has a one-in-five chance of
experiencing two parental divorces before reaching the age of 18
years. Crime statistics seems to parallel divorce in some areas. For
instance, children under ten years were 3 to 40 times more likely to
suffer parental abuse if living with a step parent and a biological par-
ent than with two biological parents.30 In urban Canada in the 1980s,
a child under two years was 70 times as likely to be killed by a parent
if living with a step parent and a biological parent than if living with
two natural parents.3 1 Some social commentators argue that child-
hood itself, a product of the Enlightenment, has virtually disap-
peared. 32 The divorce rates per 1000 women have more than doubled
between 1951 and 1993.33 The results are a bit less dramatic if we use
1945 and 1998 for two reasons. First, 1945 appears to be an anomaly
because of the backlog of divorces that was cleaned up when the troops
returned home at the end of the Second World War. Second, there is a
slight decline in divorce rates since 1991 which may be caused in part
by Americans waiting longer to marry and by the increased number of
25. Ann Landers, Peace on Earth, Good Will Still Remain Elusive, IDAHO STATESMAN,
Dec. 25, 1998, at 2E.
26. See, e.g., THE REAL WAR ON Camm: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JuS-
TICE CoInnssION (Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996).
27. See, e.g., FREDERICK D. STuRDIVANT, BusINEss AND SOCIETY: A MANAGERIAL AP-
PROACH 32-36 (rev. ed. 1981).
28. See, e.g., Lance Morrow, 1968: Like a Knife Blade, the Year Severed Past from
Future, Tom, Jan. 11, 1988, at 16.
What died with Martin Luther King Jr. and later, in great finality, with
Robert Kennedy, was a moral trajectory, a style of aspiration. King em-
bodied a nobility and hope that all but vanished. With King and Ken-
nedy, a species of idealism died the idealism that hoped to put America
back together again, to reconcile it to itself.
Id. at 23-24.
29. Robert Wright, Our Cheating Hearts, Tm, Aug. 15, 1994, at 44, 51.
30. See id. at 51.
31. See id.
32. See, e.g., NEIL PosTAN, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF CHILDHOOD (Vintage Books
1994) (1982).
33. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (U.S. Census Bureau, 1998).
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couples living together without benefit of marriage. Anyway, the
doubling of divorce, while it has multiple and complex causes, may be
seen as a proxy for a general decline in civility because it manifests an
individual's disregard for ritual commitments.
Political discourse seems to have hit an all-time low for America
with the Starr Report34 and with President Clinton's impeachment.35
One contrast is the so-called gentleman's agreement under which the
press never showed President Franklin D. Roosevelt in his wheelchair
or using crutches.3 6 Also worthy of note for contrast was the silence in
the press during the 1960s about President Kennedy's notorious wom-
anizing 37 a subject then not thought appropriate for reporting. 3S To
quote one scholar, "the event that did the most to redefine the rela-
34. THE STARR REPORT: THE FINDINGS OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL KENNETH W. STARR
ON PRESIDENT CLINTON AND THE LEWINSKY AFFARm (released by Congress on Sept.
11, 1998).
35. See, e.g., David Rogers & Jeffrey Taylor, A President Impeached and a Congress
Torn The Show Must Go On, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1998, at Al.
36. DAVID HALBERSTRAm, THE PowERs THAT BE 10 (1979).
37. WESLEY 0. HAGOOD, PRESIDENTIAL SEx: FROM THE FOUNDING FATHERS To BILL
CLINrON 135-80 (1995).
38. Id.
The media knew about Kennedy's philandering but looked the other
way. One former Associated Press reporter said, "There used to be a
gentlemen's agreement about reporting such things." The same senti-
ment was echoed by another observer, who said, "There was a sort of
gentlemen's agreement in Washington that you don't talk about my pri-
vate life and I don't talk about yours .... "
Id. at 138-39.
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tionship not only between the news media and the President, but also
between the media and all major institutions, was Watergate."3 9
In 1940, the U.S. unemployment rate was 14.6 %; and 47.5 million
Americans were working.40 Virtually all of the workers were male. In
1995, 124.9 million Americans were working; and the unemployment
rate was officially 5.6%.4 1 Of the 103 million women 16 years or older
in this country, 61 million were labor-force participants, that means
working or looking for work, in 1995.42 Women represented 46% of
the civilian labor force in 1995, and women accounted for 59% of the
labor-force growth between 1985 and 1995.43
The average American worker earned $25,852 in 1994.44 However,
the economist's assumption of ceteris paribus did not apply at the pay
window: male workers earned $32,087 compared to the female aver-
age of $18,684; and white workers took home $26,696 in contrast to
black's average of $19,772 and Hispanics average earnings of only
$18,568.45 In addition to being a focal point for discrimination and
gender-stereotyping, the American workplace is not terribly safe. As-
39. FREDERICK D. STuRDIvANT, BusnEss AND SocIETY: A MANAGERIAL APPROACH 32-
76 (rev. ed. 1981); see also BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, ALL THE PREsI-
DENT'S IEN (1974).
40. THE WoRLD AImNAC AND BOOK OF FAcTS [FOR] 1997, at 165 (1996).
41. See id
42. See id. at 172.
43. See id.













saults and violent acts accounted for 20% of the workplace deaths in
1995, a figure second only to the category of transportation incidents
that collectively accounted for 41% of workplace deaths.46 These sta-
tistics do not reflect a Norman Rockwell America at work. The arrest
rate for the general U.S. population has more than doubled between
1966 and 1997.47 Certainly arrest does not indicate guilt, but it is fair
to say that the vast majority of people who get arrested have been
severely uncivil to at least one other person.
Respect for property seems to be in decline, even anecdotally, if one
considers the increase in graffiti, littering, and trespassing. Bumper
stickers48 proclaim "Keep honking, I'm reloading" and "Horn broken,
watch driver's finger." Road rage is a new phenomenon on the Ameri-
can scene.4 9 Some may argue against a decline in civility, but they do
46. See id. at 168 (citing U.S. Department of Labor sources).
47. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRM REPORTS: CRIME THE UITED
STATES (1998).
48. An example of rudeness attempting to pass for humor: Bumper Sticker from Bad
Boy Club, Inc., Bad Boy (Calvin look-a-like) urinating on "YOU". First seen by
the author on a late model Oldsmobile Sedan, at Intersection of Hamilton St. and
Mission Ae, Spokane, WA, 8:50 AM., Oct. 21, 1999.
49. See KXLY 5 P.M. News: 600 Road Worker Deaths in 1996 (ABC afliate broad-
cast, Oct. 4, 1999). Many believe that 600 deaths of highway workers are related
to "road rage." Some Spokane road workers described angry verbal exchanges
with drivers. Workers held a national conference in Seattle to discuss this
situation.
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not even offer anecdotal evidence to bolster the argument.o Property
crime rates in the U.S., however, have more than doubled between
1960 and 1996.5'
As women increasingly entered the workplace, a male-dominated
arena, sexual harassment increased. On July 2, 1965, Title VII of the
U.S. Civil Rights Act of 196452 took effect and outlawed employment
discrimination based upon race, color, religion, national origin or sex
(meaning gender). Yet, twenty years after the effective date of this
law, the battle about justice on the job for women and Americans of
color raged across the second Reagan administration and its judicial
appointments.5 3 The defeat of President Reagan's nomination of Rob-
ert Bork to the United States Supreme Court on October 23, 1987
could be understood as a plebiscite on what Americans wanted from
their Supreme Court.54 In this light, the American people, on the bi-
centennial of the Constitution, determined by a vast majority that it
approved of the directions that the court had taken especially in the
areas of equality, privacy, and free speech.55 The passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 during the Bush Administration further strength-
ens this argument since its principal effect was to reverse some of the
more extreme employment discrimination decisions of the Rehnquist
Court and re-instate the earlier court positions.56
The awareness of the impending arrival of global capitalism cou-
pled with the discovery by investment bankers that they could make a
fortune or two using junk bonds for leveraged takeovers fueled a
merger binge in the 1980s. The result was some serious "collateral
damage," i.e., a large number of middle managers and other workers
were laid off and experienced for the first time "downward mobility."57
50. Tom Dunfee, Kolodny Professor at Wharton School of Business, University of
Pennsylvania, and Director of the Ethics Center, made this argument at the Hu-
ber Hurst Seminar on February 20, 1999 at the University of Florida. He offered
no support for it, however.
51. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, UNIFoRm CRom REPORTS: CRIm IN THE UNITED
STATES (1998).
52. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-15 (1976).
53. "To claim that there is strict color and gender-blindness in a society that is not
color and gender-blind only perpetuates discrimination and circumvents the law,"
asserted Congressman Don Edwards of California. Quotes, A.B. J., Aug. 1985,
at 35, quoted in William A. Wines, Title VII Interpretation and Enforcement in the
Reagan Years (1980-1989): The Winding Road to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 77
MARQ. L. REv. 645, 653 (1994).
54. See Wines, supra note 53, at 657.
55. See id. at 657.
56. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. For a discussion of
the impact of the Act, see Wines, supra, note 53 at 710-12.
57. For instance, the $19.8 billion takeover of CoreStates Financial Corporation by
First Union Corporation of North Carolina will result in 7000 of the bank's
19,200 employees losing their jobs. See Rick Brooks, Those Were the Days Before
We Had to Lay You Off, WALL ST. J., May 5, 1998, at Al.
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Principally, it was the down-sizing58 and threat of job loss that caused
the average American worker to increase his/her work year by 163
hours in the years between 1969 and 1987.59 By the end of the 1990s,
even the custom of waiting until after the holidays to announce layoffs
so as not to spoil workers' Christmases has fallen into the garbage can
of history.60
III. BUSINESS ETHICS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD WORK
SUPPORT WORKERS' RIGHTS TO LIMITED PRIVACY
IN THE WORKPLACE
To see life steadily and see it whole6l is a challenge for each of us;
it is the perspective that Aristotle argued was essential to the moral
position. Aristotle argued that avoiding extremes and hewing to a
"golden mean" was the path of virtue.62 Other commentators phrased
it this way:
Ethics is, first of all, the quest for, and the understanding of, the good life,
living well, a life worth living. It is largely a matter of perspective: putting
every activity and goal in its place, knowing what is worth doing and what is
not worth doing, knowing what is worth wanting and having and knowing
what is not worth wanting and having. It is keeping in mind the place of a
business career in our life as a whole, not allowing limited business successes
58. On average, 12,831 Americans get sacked every day. "Downsized, rightsized, out-
placed, decruited - our language has become rich with euphemisms for getting
the pink slip." Susan English, Companies Won't Return the Feelings, THE
SPoKEsmAN-REviEw, Aug. 29, 1999, at A9.
59. See JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AismucAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF
LEIsuRE 28-32 (1991).
60. Kristine Henry, Holiday Pink Slips No Longer Are Taboo, IDAHO STATESMAN, Dec.
20, 1998, at ID. Henry states:
There is no wonderful time for a company to declare that it is cutting
jobs, but December announcements may be the worst. There's nothing
like a pink slip to ruin someone's holiday festivities, and there's nothing
like being compared to the Grinch who stole Christmas to make a com-
pany look bad .... This year, U.S. companies have cut nearly 575,000
jobs the highest number since 1993 and many came in the month that
traditionally is reserved for parties, bonuses and good cheer.
Id.
61. See Matthew Arnold, To A Friend, quoted in KENNEm E. GOODPASTER, PERSPEC-
TIVES ON MORALITY: ESSAYS OF WILLIAM K. FRANKENA 106, 227 n.18 (1976).
62. See ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICHomAcHEAN ETHIcs 101-07
(Hugh Tredennick ed. & J.A.K. Thomson trans., Penguin Books rev ed. 1976)
(1953). Aristotle declares that:
It [virtue] is a mean between two kinds of vice, one of excess and the
other of deficiency;..., virtue discovers the mean and chooses it. Thus
from the point of view of its essence and the definition of its real nature,
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or even business success in general to eclipse our awareness of the rest of
life.6 3
This is no small task and a goal not easily reached. We can see
from the above discussion that maintaining a balanced perspective on
the topic of one's work has historically defied Western Civilization.
Overwork has been a chronic problem for many in the West, and now
research suggests it may be epidemic.6 4
An uplifting view of work is available from an English economist
who worked in India. E.F. Schumacher argues in his chapter on Bud-
dhist Economics that the function of work is "at least threefold: to give
a man a chance to utilize and develop his faculties; to enable him to
overcome his ego-centeredness by joining with other people in a com-
mon task; and to bring forth the goods and services needed for a be-
coming existence."6 5 Buddhist economics is very different from
modern materialism because "the Buddhist sees the essence of civili-
zation not in a multiplication of wants but in the purification of
human character."6 6 Character is formed primarily by work and
"work, properly conducted in conditions of human dignity and free-
dom, blesses those who do it and equally their products."67
Moral philosophy recognizes three major approaches to ethical
problems: (a) consequential ethics; 68 (b) ethics of duty;69 and (c) the
ethics of virtue.7 0 All three have distinct theoretical approaches to the
question of how can we know whether an act is good or bad. The con-
sequential position is that an act is good if it produces good results-
frequently measured by utility. Duty-based ethics measures the qual-
ity of the act by moral yardsticks that are constructed upon rules of
moral duties. If an act fulfills the actor's duty, it is moral. Thirdly,
the ethics of virtue concentrates on the character of the actor
grounded on the premise that we tend to become what we do. Hence,
we are always in the process of defining ourselves. Our objective
should always be to become a good person, "especially the kind of per-
son who performs right actions by habit and by desire."71 A good act,
63. ROBERT C. SOLOmON & KRISTINE R. HANSON, ABOVE THE BorroM LINE: AN INTRo-
DUCTION To BusINEss ETmcs 9 (1983) (emphasis in original).
64. See JULIET SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED A&IEICAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF
LEISURE (1991).
65. E.F. ScHUmACHER, SmALL Is BEAUTIFUL: ECONOuCS AS IF PEOPLE MATrEIED 51-
55 (1973).
66. Id. at 52.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Jmms RACHEIS, THE ELEzENTs OF MORAL PHILosoPHy 90-116 (2d ed.
1993) (discussing JOHN STUART MILL, ON UTILITARIANISM (1861)).
69. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF
MoRALs (Thomas K. Abbott trans. & Bobbs-Merrill co-ed., 1949) (1785).
70. See, e.g., ARISToTLE supra note 62.
71. LISA H. NEWTON, DOING GOOD AND AVOIDING EVIL: PRINCIPLEs AND REASONING OF
APPLIED ETHICS 39 (1992).
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then, would be one that complies with the rules, promotes good ends,
and-most importantly-moves us in the direction of becoming a good
person.72
One synthesis of these different ethical schools is that all tend to
promote human dignity. Utilitarianism strives to produce the great-
est good for the greatest number of those affected by the act.73 Im-
manuel Kant (1724-1804) asserts that we must always treat humanity
whether in ourselves or in others as an end and never merely as a
mean. 74 Aristotle argues that we should seek to define ourselves as
one who habitually and by desire performs right actions right actions
being those that make us better human beings.7 5 Consequently, any
work that degrades human personality, work that causes pain or work
that prevents someone from reaching her potential violates basic ethi-
cal precepts. But aside from that exclusion, what types of attitudes
toward work should an employer seek to foster in its employees?
Motivation theory states that the factors affecting job performance
fall into two categories: (a) hygiene factors; and (b) motivation fac-
tors.76 Absence of hygiene factors leads to dissatisfaction and unhap-
piness; but presence of hygiene factors does not motivate.7 7 Absence
of hygiene factors can prevent motivation; but-according to the the-
ory-only motivational factors can motivate. 78 Motivation factors in-
cluded achievement, recognition, responsibility, advancement, and the
characteristics of the job. These factors tended to be associated with
esteem or ego needs and with self-actualization. 7 9 The findings of a
Michigan study8 O seem to be consistent with this theory.
What attitudes then would a socially responsible employer foster
among its workers?S1 Five standards that we believe a socially re-
72. See id.
73. See RICHARD T. DE GEORGE, BusIMEss ETHICS 61 (5th ed. 1999).
74. See WILLIAm H. SHAw, BUSINESS ETHICS 61 (2d ed. 1996).
75. See MANUEL G. VELASQUEZ, BusINss ETHICs: CONCEPTS AND CASES 133-38 (4th
ed. 1998).
76. See FREDERICK HERZBERG, THE MANAGERIAL CHOICE: To BE EFFICIENT AND To BE
HUMAN 53-60 (rev. 2d ed. 1982).
77. See LESLIE W. RUE & LLOYD L. BYARS, MANAGEMENT THEORY AND APPLICATION
361-62 (4th ed. 1986).
78. See id. at 361.
79. See id. at 362-63.
80. See SHEPPARD & HERRICK, supra note 10.
81. See generally Norman Bowie, A Kantian Theory of Meaningful Work, J. Bus. ETH-
Ics 1083, July 1, 1998, at 1083. Bowie states that:
a Kantian would endorse the following six characteristics as characteris-
tics of meaningful work:
1. Meaningful work is work that is freely entered into.
2. Meaningful work allows the worker to exercise her autonomy and
independence.
3. Meaningful work enable the worker to develop her rational
capacities.
[Vol. 78:606
1999] AMERICAN WORKER'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY 621
sponsible employer would want to provide its workers and endorse in
its culture are:
(1) moderation in the expected amount of work;
(2) pride in the work product and in the employer;
(3) voice in the management and direction of the work;
(4) some freedom in the performance of the work; and
(5) conditions of human dignity in both performance of the
work and in the organizational climate.
But how does one define or even describe the concept of human
dignity?
A starting point for the question of human dignity, of course, might
be a dictionary. Dignity means "the quality or state of being worthy,
honored or esteemed."8 2 In turn, "worthy" is defined as "having worth
or value."8 3 Synonyms are given as "esteemable, honorable, or merito-
rious."84 The opposite of worthy is worthless. Worthless denotes
"lacking worth: syn. valueless, useless; low: syn. despicable."8 5 Direct
substitution leads to the statement that human dignity means "hav-
ing the value of a human being."
What then is the value or worth of a human being? The term
"value" comes from the Latin word "valere" meaning to be worth, to be
strong.8 6 Following various definitions and usages of "value" involv-
ing exchange [such as to "give value"] and relative worth, the seventh
definition of "value" is "something intrinsically valuable or desira-
ble."87 Thus, by substitution, human dignity would mean having the
intrinsic value of a human being. Social psychology would support
this direction because, at a minimum, there is substantial evidence for
a taboo against "intra-species killing."88 From a Jungian perspective,
a strong ancestral memory declares it is wrong to kill one of our own
kind.
Moral philosophy supports this approach. A minimalist approach
to duties to third parties (i.e., strangers) requires that one refrain
from injuring a stranger, that one tell the truth to strangers, and that
4. Meaningful work provides a wage sufficient for physical welfare.
5. Meaningful work supports the moral development of employees.
6. Meaningful work is not paternalistic in the sense of interfering
with the worker's conception of how she wishes to obtain happiness.
Id. at 1083.
82. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 233 (1963).
83. Id. at 1031.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 980.
87. Id.
88. See DAVE GRossmAN, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF LEARNING TO
KILL IN WAR AND SocrrY (1996).
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one treat strangers fairly.8 9 Fairness can be equated with justice, e.g.,
giving a person his or her due.90 What is due? The essentials are not
injuring anyone. From a law perspective, it would require no offensive
touching and also not putting one in fear of an offensive touching.
This can be understood as respecting the stranger's person and per-
sonal space. Using simple tort concepts, we have derived an elemental
notion of right to privacy as part of human dignity.
Suppose we reason backwards in an elementary binary manner
from a negative stance, the stance of worthlessness. Human dignity
would require that we not treat a human being as low or despicable.
Slavery and involuntary servitude would not be compatible with
human dignity, neither would racism or sexism or other forms of cate-
gorizing human beings as inferior or possessed of inferior qualities
based upon group membership. 9 ' Neo-classical economics, strictly
construed, would violate the concept of human dignity since it treats
human labor and thus human lives as interchangeable at the margins
with machinery and capital.92 The folk story of John Henry's competi-
tion with the steam engine illustrates a devaluing of human dignity.
Some religious faiths have a theology that decrees "There is that of
God in every human being."9 3 For believers then, to hold human labor
exchangeable or fungible with equipment and capital is to demean the
sacred or to engage in idolatry.94
89. WILLIAM H. SHAW & VINCENT BARRY, MORAL ISSUES IN BUSINESS 358-59 (7th ed.
1998).
90. See SHAw, supra note 74, at 88.
91. See, e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 244 (1957) (holding
that the First Amendment precluded New Mexico from barring an applicant from
the practice of law because he had once been a member of the Communist Party).
92. See, e.g., LARUE TONE HOSMER, THE ETHICS OF MANAGEMENT 32-50 (3d ed. 1996);
R. Larry Reynolds & William A. Wines, The Ethical Implications of Various
Schools of Economic Thought (Aug. 7, 1992) (unpublished paper, presented at
Society for Business Ethics annual meeting, Las Vegas, Nevada) (on file with
author).
93. See, e.g., NORTH PACIFIC YEARLY MEETING OF THE RELIGIOUS SocIETY OF FRIENDS
(QUAKERS), FAITH AND PRACTICE (1991).
94. The next question of whether modem employment under capitalism is compati-
ble with a healthy notion of human dignity will not be pursued. That inquiry,
while intriguing, is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. The old form of denot-
ing an employment relationship was to talk about "master and servant." Looking
at the root for servant, we find that it is the Latin participle servir, coming from
the Latin word servire, meaning to be a slave or a member of a menial class.
WEBSTER'S SEvENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 793 (1963). The synonym is
subservient. Hence, when the I.W.W. ("Wobblies") talked about "wage slaves" it
was quite literally accurate. A position of servitude would clearly violate condi-
tions of human dignity, at least under our working definition. For an excellent
history of the International Workers of the World, see MELVYN DUBoFSKY, WE
SHALL BE ALL: A HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD (2d ed.
1988).
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Law, philosophy, theology, and social psychology provide argu-
ments for an expanded notion of human dignity. Buddhist economics
contributes the concept of a "becoming existence."9 5 We can say that
"human dignity" (for our purpose) means "being accorded the respect
and status appropriate to a human being, being treated in a way that
allows or enables one to live a becoming existence, i.e., a life that
'looks good' on a human being."
IV. HISTORY OF LEGAL EFFORTS LEADING TO
WORKPLACE PRIVACY
One of the central tenets of human dignity is a right to privacy, not
an absolute right but a substantial right that yields only upon a show-
ing of a greater good. When the founders drafted the Bill of Rights,
the right to privacy, that is the right to be left alone in your person,
papers, dwelling, and effects, motivated the first, third, fourth, and
fifth amendments. In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis
wrote a ground-breaking article for the Harvard Law Review in which
they advocated a right to privacy as being required by the evolution of
technology.9 6 This academic suggestion did not find any constitu-
tional traction 97 in the courts until seventy-five years later when Mr.
Justice Douglas used it in deciding Griswold v. Connecticut.9g
In his Griswold decision, Justice William 0. Douglas wrote: "We
deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than
our political parties, older than our school system."99 In a concurring
opinion, Chief Justice Earl Warren, Mr. Justice Arthur Goldberg, and
Mr. Justice William Brennan argued that the Ninth Amendment,
which reserves rights not specifically delegated or enumerated to the
People, had been made applicable to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment.lOO
Justices Hugo Black and Potter Stewart filed strong dissenting
opinions.l 0 ' Black indicated that he agreed with all of the criticism
95. See supra text accompanying note 65.
96. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
Rxv. 193 (1890). The advances in technology that they had in mind were newspa-
pers and photography.
97. The common law tort of invasion of privacy was well established as early as 1905,
according to some authorities. See generally Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights,
Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57 Omo ST. L.J. 671, 683 n.53
(1996) (stating "the common law right of privacy was decisively recognized in
1905 by the Georgia Supreme Court in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50
S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).").
98. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
99. Id. at 486.
100. Id. at 490-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Each also
joined in the other's dissenting opinion.
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aimed at the Connecticut statute by the majority "except their conclu-
sion that the evil qualities they see in the law make it unconstitu-
tional."1o 2 Furthermore, Mr. Justice Black argued "[t]he Court talks
about a constitutional "right of privacy" as though there is some con-
stitutional provision .... But there is not."103 Taking aim at the "so-
called right of privacy," Justice Black opined:
Trivacy' is a broad, abstract and ambiguous concept that can easily be
shrunken in meaning but which can also, on the other hand, easily be inter-
preted as a constitutional ban against many things other than searches and
seizures .... For these reasons I get nowhere in this case by talk about a
constitutional 'right of privacy' as an emanation from one or more constitu-
tional provisions. I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am neverthe-
less compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless
prohibited by some specific constitutional provision.104
Warren, Goldberg and Brennan's position did not gain any further
advocates and so remains a concurring theory to reach the same result
that Douglas reached without recourse to the obscure Ninth Amend-
ment. Mr. Justice White filed an opinion concurring in the result but
not the majority's reasoning.1 0 5 Mr. Justice Harlan also filed an opin-
ion concurring in the judgment.106 The Griswold decision, a 6-2 vote
with six separate opinions, laid the foundation for rights to privacy in
the marital bed and ultimately a right to privacy in reproductive deci-
sions, most prominently Roe v. Wade.107 Our direction, of course, is to
find the path to workplace rights to privacy on behalf of workers. This
road has landmarks in the Coors Brewery case10 8 and the question of
102. Id. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 508 (Black, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 509-10 (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
105. Id. at 502 (White, J., concurring). Mr. Justice White argued that the Connecticut
statute failed to pass the strict scrutiny test for laws abridging liberty under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The statute failed because it was unnecessarily and
overly broad in view of the law's stated objective which was to prevent the use of
contraceptives by persons engaging in illicit sexual relations to the end that such
relations would be discouraged. Id. at 506-07 (White, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 499 (Harlan, J. concurring).
I fully agree with the judgment of reversal, but find myself unable to
join the Court's opinion.
In my view, the proper constitutional inquiry in this case is whether
this Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment because the enactment violates basic values "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325. For reasons stated at length in my dissenting opinion in Poe v.
Ullman, supra, [367 U.S. 497, 539-545.] I believe that it does.
Id. at 499-500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
107. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
108. See Frederocl D. Sturdivant, The Case of Adolph Coors Company, in THE CoRPO-
RATE SOCIAL CHALLENGE: CASES AND COMMETArIES 456-76 (4th ed. 1990).
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polygraph testing 0 9 as well as in the federal act giving workers the
right to see their personnel records.110
V. COMPARISON TO OTHER WESTERN NATION STATES AND
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
A. Privacy Rights in Germany
The notion that privacy is a fundamental right can be traced to
Germany's Constitution, the Grundgesetz.'11 Article 10 of this "Basic
Law" provides that the privacy of letters, posts, and telecommunica-
tions shall be inviolable.112 A preface provided by German President
Richard von Weizaeker in the amendment of the Grundgesetz, an
amendment caused by German unification in 1990, underscores the
importance of this basic right. It states,
"For more than forty years, the Basic Law has determined the development of
the polity of the Federal Republic of Germany. In its area of application, it
has bestowed on the citizens a life in liberty, democratic self-determination
and personal responsibility, protected by law and justice."1 1 3
The Federal Data Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz) is
designed to protect the individual's privacy as to data that has been
collected about this individual. This statute governs data collection,
processing and dissemination of data by all public or quasi-public
agencies and in a more select way also governs some data collection by
private entities. Application of this law to private entities is restricted
to data that are collected in a systematic fashion or automatically and/
or are processed or stored by automatic/electronic means.114
Germany has an extensive system of Data Protection officials
(Datenschuetzer) at the federal, state, county and in most public insti-
tutions down to the department level. There is formal training for
such officials, and there are formal associations/committees formed by
the individuals who have such a job or authority component assigned
to them. They generally have subpoena powers, rights to examine,
secure data and can make recommendations regarding storage and
disposal.
109. See the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 2001 (1994)
(prohibiting most employers from using polygraphs in pre-employment testing).
110. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994). The purpose of the
Privacy Act was to allow individuals to learn what information the government
maintains on them and to correct or amend any false data. Additionally, the act
enables public and private sector employees to review their personnel files.
111. Parliamentary Council F.R.G. (1949, May 23) Basic Law F.R.G.: Article 10.
112. See id.
113. Preface to BAsic LAw for the Federal Republic of Germany as amended by the
Unification Treaty, 31 August 1990 and federal statute of 23 September 1990,
FEDERAL LAW GAZETTE 11 at 885.
114. BDSG [Bundesdatenschutzgesetz], December 1990.
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While most of Germany's efforts to secure privacy used to be re-
stricted to assuring privacy in relation to public institutions, major
inroads have been and continue to be made for privacy in the public
sector. Current laws for privacy in the workplace rest on two pillars.
The first pillar is individual-specific and emanates from the
Bundesdatenshutzgesetz (BDSG) (literally translated this is the fed-
eral law for the protection of data). Aside from the BDSG, there are
also a number of sectoral laws and relevant labor court rulings such as
those providing for examination of employment and other files by the
employee. One requirement for the employer who systematically
gathers data is that the data be "objectively" necessary for the regular
conduct of business.115 Even if the employee grants permission, objec-
tive need must still be shown. Yet another basis is found in the Per-
sonnel Records Law.116 This goes beyond the requirement that data
collection is systematic and/or automatic. It includes all collections of
data about an employee. The employee has the right to examine the
record. Also, the employee has the right to receive a printout, in an
easily understood format, of all the data kept on him or her.1l7 The
employee has the further right to add items to the record; and, in some
cases, the employee may have the record corrected.118
The second pillar is a collective-legal protection provided by the
right of participation in data collection and privacy protection granted
to the workers' councils (Betriebsrat) found in German industry. This
right is further enhanced by specific arrangements found in union-in-
dustry contracts and many company specific agreements.1 9 The Be-
triebsrat has the right to determine whether the employer is in
compliance with the laws. It also participates in the design of data
collection instruments, e.g., questionnaires. Co-determination in re-
gard to the control of observation equipment is also provided; this in-
cludes cameras and PC-based controls etc.120 However, even though
the law prescribes objective need, some difficulty exists as to whether
that standard is followed in actual practice. 12 ' There is a "gray area"
that justifies additional legislation. An Employee Privacy Law has
been in development, but it has yet to be enacted.122
115. See id.






122. Directive 95/46/EC of the Parliament and of the Council of 24, 24 Oct. 1995.
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B. Privacy Rights in the European Community
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data
provides an important foundation for privacy in Europe and is likely
to lead to major advances in member countries and those countries
that aspire to membership. It states that:
1. In accordance with this Directive, Member States shall protect the funda-
mental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to
privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.
2. Member States shall neither restrict nor prohibit the free flow of personal
data between Member States for reasons connected with the protection af-
forded under paragraph 1.123
C. Privacy Rights in Austria
As co-signer of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Basic Rights (1958), Austria has taken steps to
implement privacy rights. The Austrian Datenschutzgesetz guaran-
tees each citizen privacy of data collected and stored by all public enti-
ties. In one case challenging application of this law, the Austrian
Supreme Court affirmed the "protection of privacy [as] an inborn
right."124 However, in the same 1978 ruling, the court declared that
although privacy is a basic right it must be balanced against all inter-
ests endangered as well as the interests of the collective, i.e., the em-
ployer and the larger society.12 5
D. Privacy Rights in Canada
Canada's Federal Privacy Law (1982) applies to all federal govern-
ment departments, most federal agencies, and some federal Crown
corporations.12 6 The Privacy Commissioner of Canada oversees the
Act, and has powers to receive complaints, conduct investigations, and
attempt to resolve disputes, among others.12 7
The private sector is another matter entirely. Only Quebec has a
comprehensive privacy act for the private sector. Quebec's Act Re-
specting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sec-
tor128 provides a detailed framework for the collection, use and
disclosure of personal information. Commission on Access to Informa-
123. Art. 8 Abs.2 der Europaischen Konvention zum Schutz der Menschenrechte und
Grundfreiheiten (BGB1.Nr.210/1958).
124. OGH 24.10.1978 SZ 51/146.
125. See id.
126. Privacy Act, Legislative History: 1980-81-82-83, c.111, SCU II "1."
127. See id.
128. Task Force on Electronic Legislation (1998). Privacy: The Protection of Personal
Information. Legislation.
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tion is responsible for conducting investigations and settling disputes
and generally overseeing the Act's enforcement.129
In the other Provinces, protection of privacy in the private sector is
sporadic and uneven. Many industries are not subject to any rules
regarding the collection, use and disclosure of personal information. A
few industries, however, are covered by what the Privacy Commis-
sioner has termed "a patchwork" of laws, regulations and codes. 30
The patchwork is made of various federal and provincial laws that re-
sult in incomplete and possibly inconsistent protections. Effective as
the patchwork may be in particular sectors, it does not establish com-
mon principles. This incompleteness causes uncertainty for business
managers and spotty protection for consumers. This patchwork be-
comes even more inadequate in the face of new developments in elec-
tronics, computers, and communications technology.131
However, the Canadian government has recently introduced legis-
lation to protect privacy in the private sector. 132 This proposal would
apply to all personal information in the federally regulated sector, i.e.,
banking, telecommunication, transportation. Interestingly, the bill
was drafted based upon consensus among consumers and industry re-
garding the need for and the nature of such legislation.' 3 3 In addi-
tion, the government actually conducted research into the subject.13 4
Most efforts at privacy legislation begin with "fair information
practices," which can be understood as sets of privacy principles. Fair
information practices are guidelines for the collection, use, disclosure,
retention and disposal of personal information. Sets of fair informa-
tion practices vary, but they usually include the following principles:
-ensuring public awareness and transparency (openness) of infor-
mation policies and practices
-establishing necessity and relevance of the information collected.
-building in finality (establishing the uses of the information in
advance and eventually destroying it).
-identifying the person who has responsibility for protecting per-
sonal information within an organization.
-getting informed consent from the individual.
-maintaining accuracy and completeness of records.
-providing access to the information and a right of correction.
129. See id.
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VI. DISCUSSION OF WORKPLACE PRIVACY
A. Essential Elements of Privacy
When Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis announced their novel
thesis in 1890,135 the authors saw the advent of modern newspapers
and photography as a leap in technology that threatened the privacy
of ordinary citizens.13 6 Their main points can be summarized in these
words:
they argued that the existing common law recognized a principle of"inviolate
personality" which could be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual.
Although arguing eloquently for explicit recognition of a right to privacy, they
offered little in the way of definition, beyond locating privacy as part of the
more general right to the immunity of the person-the right to one's
personality.
1 3 7
In 1905, the Georgia Supreme Court "decisively recognized" the com-
mon law right of privacy in a case that was to become a landmark.138
Dean William Prosser addressed privacy in 1960 in a well-known
law review article' 3 9 and declared that it had four elements: "The law
of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four different
interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name,
but otherwise have almost nothing in common ... "140 Despite vigor-
ous debate about the nature, definition, and value of a common law
concept of privacy,'41 the common law tort of invasion of privacy is
now understood to apply in four distinct but interrelated situations.
The right of privacy may be invaded by: (1) "unreasonable intrusion
upon the seclusion of another;"'14 2 (2) "appropriation of the other's
name or likeness;"'14 3 (3) "unreasonable publicity given to the other's
private life;"144 or (4) "publicity that unreasonably places the other in
a false light before the public."'14 5 Clearly, from the perspective of the
authors of the Restatement of Torts, Dean Prosser's analysis from his
1960 article carried the debate.146
135. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 96.
136. See id. at 195.
137. Kim, supra note 97, at 682-83 (citation omitted).
138. See id. at 683 n.53.
139. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383 (1960).
140. Id. at 389.
141. For an excellent discussion as well as a collection of this literature, see Kim,
supra, note 97.




146. See, e.g., Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An An-
swer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 962 (1964). Bloustein argues that the
single interest, protection of human dignity, underlines the broad diversity of
cases collected under invasion of privacy. See id. at 1000-03.
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In a parallel but not unrelated development, the concept of privacy
has been recognized in constitutional jurisprudence.14 7 Although not
named in the Constitution, a right to privacy has been held protected
by the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights, as well as by several specific
amendments.148 "Penumbra" is defined as "a space of partial illumi-
nation (as in an eclipse) between the perfect shadow on all sides and
the full light."'149 The word itself is derived from the Latin words
meaning "almost shadow."' 5 0 Due to Justice Douglas's opinion, the
word has come to mean "a body of rights held to be guaranteed by
implication in a civil constitution."' 5 In a sense, these would be
rights that exist on the fringe, in the partial light or shadow from the
emanations of the directly granted rights in the Bill of Rights. Conse-
quently, when workers seek protection in alleged rights of privacy, it
is no stretch to say that they are seeking shelter in the shadows of the
law.
B. Reduced Expectations of Privacy in the Workplace
Clearly, a person has an expectation of privacy in her person and
in her home.' 5 2 But what expectation of privacy exists for a worker in
a workplace belonging to the employer? Whatever, they are; surely,
such expectations must be lesser than the expectations the worker en-
joys in her home. In 1890, Warren and Brandeis wrote that the right
of privacy was a "general right of the individual to be let alone."'153
But the employer when it provides work has certain legitimate inter-
ests in monitoring the employees' performance and in NOT just letting
them alone. For instance, the employer wants to monitor productiv-
ity, employee morale, and its ownership interest (property) to protect
it from pilferage and sabotage.
147. One of the most unfortunate results of this parallel jurisprudence is that public
sector employees enjoy more protection against invasions of their privacy than do
comparable private sector employees. See, e.g., Laura B. Pincus & Clayton Trot-
ter, The Disparity Between Public Sector and Private Sector Employee Privacy
Protections: A Call for Legitimate Privacy Rights for Private Sector Workers, 33
AM. Bus. L.J. 51 (1995). Professors Pincus and Trotter conclude, "[clonsistent
federal protection of privacy in the private sector is warranted" and note that it
has been called for by various authors since the mid-1970s. Id. at 55.
148. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
149. MsmuA WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 860 (10th ed. 1993).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
153. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 96, at 205.
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Courts that have rendered decisions in this area have tended to
use a balancing of interests approach.154 Also, courts have noted that
a long history of intensive government regulation of an industry, say
banking, would tend to weaken expectations of privacy of officials
working in such industries.155 One author states "[tihe overall pur-
pose of the business of the employer and the nature of the employee's
specific job are relevant considerations in determining which intru-
sions violate socially sanctioned claims of privacy."'5 6 Although
avoiding the word "balancing" entirely, the author also declared that
"the more closely an employer's inquiries or practices trench on inter-
ests at the recognized core of individual privacy, the greater the need
for some specific justification."'157 Yet, the initial inquiry for the court,
wrote the same commentator, was to determine "general societal un-
derstandings" of privacy.158
As judges wrestled with balancing the legitimate interests of em-
ployers in workforce supervision with the equally important rights of
workers to be free from unnecessary and outrageous intrusions, work-
ers took their complaints in increasing numbers to the courtrooms of
America. We used West Publishing key number 8, invasion of per-
sonal safety, comfort or privacy, as a proxy for the amount of litigation
in the privacy area. Turning to the Decennial Digests published by
West, we measured the number of pages under key number 8 and
found a dramatic increase in privacy cases between 1947 and 1996.
This material indicated an absolute increase in privacy cases. We also
wanted to know whether privacy cases had increased relative to the
increase in litigation over the same time period. Consequently, we de-
termined the total number of pages in the same Decennial Digests.
We divided the number of pages for key number 8 by the total number
of pages in each digest in order to determine the relative importance of
privacy cases to litigation in the U.S. generally. We found that pri-
vacy cases nearly doubled in significance as part of the overall litiga-
tion between 1947 and 1996.
C. Problem Areas for Workplace Privacy Concepts
Despite the conservative approaches to the right of privacy that have
prevailed in most courts, courts have applied more caution in ruling
against employees in several areas where the courts find that em-
154. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 97, at 698-709.
155. See, e.g., Gimbelv. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re Gimbel), 77 F.3d 593,600 (2d
Cir.); Katherine Scherb, Administrative Subpoenas for Private Financial Records:
What Protection for Privacy Does the Fourth Amendment Afford? 1996 Wis. L.
REv. 1075, 1096-99 (discussing Gimbel).
156. Kim, supra note 97, at 707.
157. Id. at 706.
158. Id. at 705.
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ployer actions may intrude upon the employees' right to be let
alone.1 5 9 The following sections address some of these areas in which
employer actions have included some of the most blatantly intrusive
inquiries into employee behavior and personal histories.
1. Drug Testing
Drug tests fall into five categories: random, periodic, suspicion-
based, post-accident, and pre-employment. In some jurisdictions,
mandatory random drug tests have, under certain circumstances,
been held to be actionable invasions of privacy.' 60 Generally, these
decision support the observation that drug testing invades an em-
ployee's privacy if either: (a) safeguards are not incorporated into the
tests to protect the employee's privacy; or (b) the test is used to reveal
other private medical facts [besides drug use] especially when such
facts are embarrassing and unrelated to workplace performance, e.g.
pregnancy. Two lawyers that practice in this area summarize the
state of the law in these words:
The analysis in these cases involves balancing employee and employer inter-
ests. To require an employee to disclose his drug status obviously involves
some intrusion into the employee's right to be let alone. A court will weigh
this invasion against the employer's need to know whether the employee is a
drug user. Thus, drug testing may be an invasion in some settings (e.g., the
entertainment industry) and not in others (e.g. the defense industry).1 6 1
Another author uses these words to capture much the same idea: "pri-
vacy norms are contextually determined."i 62 She goes on to argue
that privacy "is not only culturally contingent, but relationally contin-
gent as well, for the meaning of an apparent encroachment on the 'ter-
ritories of the self turns on the social relationship between the
parties."' 63
Courts, charged with administering the laws, seem less delicate in
the manner in which they deal with privacy claims. For instance,
Robert Gilmore, an engineer, had been a long-time employee of Mus-
tang Fuel. Mustang, a company that had no drug testing policy, was
acquired by Enogex, a company that did have a random drug testing
program. Gilmore was randomly selected and ordered to have a drug
test. He refused, claiming a right to privacy. He was fired. After his
firing, Gilmore voluntarily submitted to a drug test (at the same hos-
pital). His results were negative, but Gilmore stayed fired. He sued
159. See Steven C. Bennett & Scott Locke, Privacy in the Workplace: A Practical Pri-
mer, 49 LAB. L.J. 781, 784 (1998).
160. See, e.g., Folmsbee v. Tech Tool Grinding & Supply, Inc., 630 N.E.2d 586, 590
(Mass. 1994); Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 609 A.2d 11, 19 (N.J.
1992).
161. Bennett & Locke, supra note 159, at 784 (citations omitted).
162. Kim, supra note 97, at 695.
163. Id. at 695.
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and lost. The Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld Enogex's right to m-
pose random drug testing even though Gilmore was not in a safety-
sensitive position and despite Gilmore's many years as a satisfactory
employee. 1 64
One review of the Gilmore decision stated: "ir. Gilmore ... lost his
job... because he conscientiously objected to being tested, on grounds
of privacy. It is debatable whether or not the Company's policy actu-
ally conduced toward a drug free workplace; but the Company's policy
certainly did insure a workforce resigned to the surrender of its
privacy."' 6 5
An enormous growth in the testing of applicants and of incumbent
employees by Corporate America for metabolites of certain controlled
substances, primarily marijuana and cocaine was fostered by the so-
called "War on Drugs." This drug screening triggered a batch of cases
alleging violations of the right to privacy.' 66 It also precipitated legis-
lation: "Fifteen states have regulated workplace drug testing primar-
ily to assure the accuracy of test results . . . . Montana limits
applicant screening to safety sensitive jobs" and Iowa and Vermont
"otherwise limit the screening of applicants" to insure that drug
screens are done as a part of pre-employment medical examina-
164. See Gilmore v. Enogex, Inc., 878 P.2d 360, 364 (0ka. 1994).
165. Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Privacy, American Values, and The Law, 72 Cm.-
KFENT L. REv. 221, 232 (1996) (citations omitted).
166. See id. at 230.
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tions. 16 7 The supreme courts of Massachusetts, New Jersey and West
Virginia have limited drug screening to safety sensitive positions.6s
2. Searching Employee Work Areas
Searches of employee work areas such as desks, lockers, and mail
necessarily raise privacy concerns. Again the context and the rela-
tionship are important considerations. But the fact that an employer
owns the desk or locker does not confer an unlimited power to search
the same. The cases, however, are in some disarray. For instance, one
court held that a jury could find an employer liable for examining con-
fidential materials found on top of an employee's desk.169 But in an-
other decision, an employer who discreetly and covertly searched an
employee's unlocked desk, located in an open area, for employee-
owned documents was held not liable for invasion of privacy.i7 0 An-
other court held that searching an employee's locker to which the com-
pany allowed the employee a key might invade his privacy.i 7 i Yet,
167. Id. at 230-31.
168. See id. at 231 (citing Webster v. Motorola, Inc., 637 N.E.2d 203, 208 (Mass. 1994);
Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 609 A.2d 11, 21 (N.J. 1992); Twigg v.
Hercules Corp., 406 S.E.2d 52, 55-56 (W. Va. 1990)).
169. See Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
170. See O'Bryan v. KTIV Television, 868 F. Supp. 1146, 1159 (N.D. Iowa 1994), afl'd
in part, rev'd in part, 64 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 1995).
171. See K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984).
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other courts have held that searching an employee's lunch bucket172
or a car parked on the company lot1 7 3 would not.
Although the Fourth Amendment comes into play only when gov-
ernment actions threatens an individual's "reasonable expectations of
privacy,"174 developments under the Constitutional standard are a
parallel development and shed some light on social expectations. The
Fourth Amendment threshold test has been treated as a two-prong
inquiry, asking first whether the individual "exhibited an actual (sub-
jective) expectation of privacy" and second, whether that expectation
is "one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'"1 75 In a
Fourth Amendment challenge to an employer's search of an em-
ployee's desk and file cabinets, the Supreme Court held that an em-
ployee had a reasonable expectation of privacy when the employee did
not share the desk or file cabinets, had occupied his office for more
than seventeen years, and had kept personal materials in his office. 17 6
Granted the Fourth Amendment brings its own weight and history to
a decision, we nonetheless find it difficult to reconcile these cases since
the starting point for all of them is an expectation of privacy based
upon the same U.S. society.
172. See Simpson v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 450 A.2d 305, 309
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982).
173. See Terrell v. Rowsey, 647 N.E.2d 662, 665 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
174. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
175. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
176. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718-19 (1987).
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3. Surveillance of Employees
Surveillance of employees takes many forms.177 Everything from
monitoring telephone calls,178 checking e-mail, 179 eavesdropping on
conversations,18 0 and using hidden cameras18 1 has been subject at
various times to claims of invasion of privacy. Surveillance alone will
not violate an employee's right to privacy. Again, the critical issue is
whether the employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy.18 2 We
will examine some of the issues in the following subsections.
a. Capturing Conversations
A starting point for this discussion is the 1968 federal law on wire-
tapping that was designed to regulate interception of wire and oral
communication.18 3 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA) of 1986 was an amendment to the 1968 wiretap statute and
was created to regulate and control forms of electronic communica-
tions that had been invented since 1968, primarily computer sys-
tems.18 4 Voice-activated recording machines attached to company
177. A survey of more than 1000 businesses by the American Management Associa-
tion International revealed that two-thirds of U.S. businesses eavesdrop on their
employees. Liz Stevens, Feeling Watched? No Wonder, Snooping On Employees
Commonplace and Legal, THE SPOKESMAN-RmEW, Oct. 6, 1999, at Al.
178. See, e.g., Watkins v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 1349 (S.D. Miss.
1992), aft'd, 979 F. 2d 1535 (5th Cir. 1992); Jackson v. Nationwide Credit, Inc.,
426 S.E.2d 630 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
179. See, e.g., Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996); Smyth v.
Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
180. See, e.g., Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176 (7th Cir.
1993); Speer v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction, 624 N.E.2d 251 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1993); Steve Casimiro, The Spying Game Moves into U.S. Worhplace,
FORTUNE, Mar. 30, 1998, at 152-53. Casimiro describes offices being equipped
with microphones hidden in pens, warehouses, and stockrooms; he also discusses
hidden video cameras in employee break rooms. Technology has made the tools
for eavesdropping cheap, small, powerful, and accessible. A 1997 survey by the
American Management Association found that nearly two-thirds of employers
conduct electronic surveillance of employees and that about one-quarter of those
conducting surveillance do not inform their employees. David C. Yamada, Voices
from the Cubicle: Protecting and Encouraging Private Employee Speech in the
Post-Industrial Workplace, 19 BERKELEY J. ENP. & LAB. L. 1, 16 (1998) (quoting
Spying on Workers Common and Usually Legal, Group Reports, BosToN GLOsE,
May 23, 1997, at A3).
181. See, e.g., Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 443 N.W.2d 382,384 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that the use of a high power camera lens to look into an employee's home
did not violate a right to privacy).
182. See Bennett & Locke, supra note 159, at 785.
183. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
§ 505, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
184. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 101,
100 Stat. 1848, 1851 (1986), amended Title HI of The Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
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telephones have been held to generate liability and did not qualify
under the "business extension" exception to federal law.'8 5 Con-
ducting surveillance in a restroom invades privacy;'S 6 but conducting
similar surveillance outside the entrance to a restroom does not, in the
absence of any person being seen undressed. 8 7
b. Monitoring Telephone Calls
Federal law prohibits the willful interception of any "wire, oral, or
electronic" communication through the use of "any electronic, mechan-
ical or other device" except under specified circumstances.' 8 8 Thus,
eavesdropping on an employee's telephone conversations is broadly
prohibited. Two exceptions to this blanket prohibition are generally
applicable to employers. First, interception is expressly permitted
when "one of the parties to the communication has given prior con-
sent."'8 9 Second, the business extension exception excludes any com-
ponent of a "telephone or telegraph instrument" used in the ordinary
course of its business from the definition of "electric, mechanical or
other device." Consequently, monitoring with a "business extension"
does not violate the law. Interceptions of telephone calls that are not
covered by these exclusions can result in fine and imprisonment and
also subject the employer to civil liability.
The consent exception, although seemingly straight-forward, has
been held to include so-called "implied consent." If an employee is
aware that the employer monitors or records telephone conversations
on its lines, yet uses such a line, "most courts" will find implied con-
sent and no liability attaches under federal law.' 9 0 As for the busi-
ness extension exception, courts have held that clandestine,
indiscriminate monitoring that picks up both personal and business
calls does not qualify because such monitoring is not a valid part of a
business operation.191
185. See Pascale v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 898 F. Supp. 276 (D.N.J. 1995).
186. See Speer v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction, 624 N.E.2d 251, 254 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1993).
187. See Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1183 (7th Cir.
1993).
188. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1994).
189. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1994).
190. William C. Martucci & Jeffirey M. Place, Privacy Rights and Employee Communi-
cation in the Workplace, EriLoymanr REL. TODAY, Summer 1998, at 109, 110.
191. See, e.g., Sanders v. Robert Bosch Corp., 38 F.3d 736 (4th Cir. 1994). But cf
Knight v. City of New Orleans, No. CIV. 89-3409, 1991 WL 126387, at *1 (E.D.
La. July 1, 1991). In that case, a police chief was fired when his racial comments,
captured by a telephone monitoring system, were made public. In the ensuing
litigation, the recording was held legal because the monitored conversation was a
business one and the chief was aware of the department's policy of recording tele-
phone conversations.
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c. E-mail and Computer Monitoring
Federal law treats telephone and e-mail communications very dif-
ferently. As mentioned above, federal law prohibits the interception of
private messages. However, once a message is stored in an electronic
format, a different federal statute applies. That statute prohibits un-
authorized access to electronically stored messages but also provides a
blanket exception for service providers.192 Consequently, employees
have very little chance of prevailing on a privacy violation in the area
of computer e-mail.
Unlike telephone conversations that disappear into the ether in
the absence of any recording device, e-mail and voice mail messages
are routinely and of necessity saved on computer hard drives, and fre-
quently backed-up to tape or some other form of long-term storage de-
vice. System administrators or anyone else with access to these
sources are free to review all of the stored messages without any need
for any individual user passwords. Courts have held that employers
qualify as "service providers" and have also held that employees can-
not have any "reasonable expectation" of privacy in any messages sent
over such systems.19 3
Although our reading of the cases convinces us that the dominant
view is one of no expectation of privacy, there is no consensus in the
courts that no one could, under any circumstances, ever have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in either e-mail or voice-mail.'94
d. Regulating Personal Associations
Numerous employers have policies that address some aspect of
their employees' personal associations off the premises. Litigation not
infrequently follows job actions taken against employees who violate
such policies or who commit off-duty acts that the employer finds ob-
jectionable. Recent examples include employees who have been fired
for living with someone of the opposite sex without benefit of mar-
riage,19 5 smoking,196 drinking,' 9 7 and motorcycling.19s As Professor
Dworkin, an expert in this area, has concluded:
192. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (1994).
193. See, e.g., Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996); see also Payne
v. Norwest Corp., 911 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mont. 1995) (holding that voice mail was
not protected from recording and dissemination to others).
194. See Martucci & Place, supra note 190, at 114 and cases cited therein.
195. See, e.g., Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 903 P.2d 351 (Or. 1995) (plain-
tiff used theory of religious harassment to recover when employer told him he
was a sinner and going to hell because he lived with his girlfriend); see also State
ex rel. Johnson v. Porter Farms, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
196. See, e.g., City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1995). The tobacco
industry fired up a campaign for state laws protecting employees who smoked off
the job. This campaign has been expanded to cover other off-duty behaviors.
Now, 29 states have enacted some version of off-the-job privacy protection laws.
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At present, marriage discrimination statutes, lifestyle protection statutes, and
Title VIis protection against religious discrimination offer employees the
most likely avenues to successful vindication of their associational rights.
Common law theories, including the tort of invasion of privacy, have proved
less successful although they are growing in use and success. 1 9 9
VII. CONCLUSION
A. Prudence of Using Law to Guarantee Privacy
Writers and law professors and judges do not agree on any specific
definition of "right to privacy."200 Some noted scholars have argued
that the entire construct is a mistake; others have declared that it is
so unwieldy that it collapses from its own weight; and still others have
praised it in almost exalted terms as necessary to human dignity.
Other writers have declared that it is only derivative, coming from
other better defined torts and concepts; and some have dismissed it as
a "petty tort."2 0 We are reminded of the limits of law to effect social
changes as we read the cases and commentary.20 2 Law is a social in-
stitution, and in many ways it cannot rise above its source.
B. Problems of Social & Human Costs Left Out of Business
Equations
The double entry accounting system used in American business
has no place for so-called "externalities" on the balance sheet or in-
come statement. Thus, the increase in human suffering, alcohol
abuse, suicides, batteries, and homicides that flow in the wake of plant
Terry Morehead Dworkin, It's My Life Leave Me Alone: Off-the-Job Employee As-
sociational Privacy Rights, 35 Aic. Bus. L.J. 47, 51 (1997).
197. See, e.g., Best Lock Co. v. Review Bd., 572 N.E.2d 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
198. See, e.g., Lewis L. Maltby & Bernard J. Dushman, Whose Life Is It Anyway Em-
ployer Control of Off-Duty Behavior, 13 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 645, 646 n.7
(1994).
199. See Dworkin, supra note 196, at 98.
200. See Kim, supra note 97, at 683-85 and works cited therein.
201. See Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?
31 LAw & CONTMP. PROBS. 326 (1966).
I suspect that fascination with the great Brandeis trade mark, excite-
ment over the law at a point of growth, and appreciation of privacy as a
key value have combined to dull the normal critical sense of judges and
commentators and have caused them not to see the pettiness of the tort
they have sponsored.
Id. at 328.
202. Lord Stowell stated:
Courts of Justice do not pretend to furnish cures for all the miseries of
human life. They redress or punish gross violations of duty but they go
no farther; they cannot make men virtuous; and as the happiness of the
world depends upon its virtue, there may be unhappiness in it which
human laws cannot undertake to remove."
Evans v. Evans, 161 Eng. Rep. 466, 477 (1790)
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closings and layoffs do not reflect adversely on the financial state-
ments of the companies that fire people and move plants/mills to third
world countries. If business performance is measured in quarterly
and annual financial reports, as virtually all of it is these days, then
businesses are free to have no conscience or social responsibility.20 3
My initial thesis was that workers are striving to erect a privacy
structure in an effort to offset the decline in civility in U.S. society. If
that is so, one of the largest causes of incivility in this country is busi-
ness conduct. 20 4 The principal apologists for insensitive behavior to-
ward workers (and the environment) are the neo-classical economists,
many from the University of Chicago school of thought, who legitima-
tize greed and indifference toward human suffering. Ultimately, this
behavior is sanctified by accountants who fail to see beyond their be-
loved double entry system and GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting
Practices).
C. Decline of Civility & Increased Claims of Workplace
Privacy: Correlation, Cause or Coincidence?
A wag once declared that in the United States the incidence of can-
cer correlates almost perfectly with milk drinking. His point was that
correlation and causation are two entirely different concepts, even
though they are sometimes conflated in people's thinking. Thus, even
if we were to quantify a decline in civility and an increase in worker's
privacy claims, it might be merely coincidence or simple correlation.
Consequently, we have only advanced a hypothesis that workers are
seeking shelter from incivility in the workplace by making claim to
workplace privacy rights.
D. Root Cause In At-will Rule & Need For Workers' Bill of
Rights?
Another author has suggested that the real cause of workplace
problems with privacy is the underlying dominant rule of employment
in the United States, employment-at-will. 20 5 This author details the
relationship between these doctrines in the following words:
Although the common law tort of invasion of privacy does offer protection
against all manner of unreasonable intrusions on employee privacy, its appli-
203. See, e.g., Oliver Edwards, Will Europe Reform its Corporate Governance?,
EUROBUSINESS, Apr. 1999, at 65-66 in which the author interviews business guru
Peter Drucker. Drucker asserts that the key to financial success in the U.S. and
U.K. is that corporations exists for the benefit of their shareholders. He appar-
ently believes that Japan, Germany and Italy face financial ruin unless they con-
vert to this corporate dogma.
204. See, e.g., MARTiA BANTA, TAYLORED LIVEs: NARRATIvE PRODUCTIONS IN THE AGE
OF TAYLOR, VEBLEN, AND FORD (1993).
205. See Kim, supra note 97.
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cation in the workplace is complicated by the conflicting right of the employer
to terminate the relationship at will. Most courts that have considered the
issue agree that an employer may be liable in tort for unreasonable intrusions
on employee privacy after the fact .... However, when the employer gives
notice in advance that it intends to engage in the same intrusive practices, the
protection offered by the common law tort is problematic. If the employee ac-
cedes to the employer's intrusive practices (or merely continues to work after
receiving notice), her employer will likely assert that she consented to the in-
trusion as a defense to her claim that her privacy was wrongfully invaded. If,
on the other hand, she objects to the intrusion and is fired as a result, the
common law privacy tort provides no relief, because no invasion of her privacy
has occurred. She has suffered the loss of her job, but no loss of privacy. It is
at this point that the interpretation of the at-will doctrine becomes crucially
important. If applied strictly, the employee cannot recover for the loss of her
job either, and will be left without recourse, regardless how invasive the em-
ployer's threatened actions were, or how justified her refusal to comply with
her employer's demands. 2 0 6
E. Circularity of Civility & Privacy: No Shelter Here
If the law were to provide a meaningful refuge for lack of civility in
the workplace, it would need to be both independent of the declining
level of civility and able to provide a bulwark against the decline
pegged to an independent standard. Unfortunately, the current state
of the law regarding the so-called right to privacy does neither. The
benchmark for the right to privacy is the social standard or norm of
civility.2 07 Consequently, when civility drops in the U.S. society, so
too does the protection provided by the law. The result is that the
refuge provided is somewhat illusory at least in general legal theory.
The tort of invasion of the right of privacy requires an "outrageous"
invasion of a "reasonable expectation" of privacy. In both the question
of outrage208 and the issue of reasonableness, the only standards are
those brought to these issues from the society. The result, as summa-
rized above, is that the current law does not provide a meaningful
shelter from the nationwide decline of civility. As one authority mov-
ingly declares:
206. See id. at 675-76 (emphasis supplied) (footnotes omitted).
207. An interesting illustration of how social norms actually can be more effective
than regulation is discussed in Michele L. Tyler, Blowing Smoke: Do Smokers
Have a Right? Limiting the Privacy Rights of Cigarette Smokers, 86 GEo. L.J. 783,
808-11 (1998). She notes that a significant number of smokers agree that they
should not smoke in the presence of non-smokers and that many smokers volun-
tarily refrain from smoking at work or in many indoor public places. Ms. Tyler
concludes that a civility norm "is almost in place with regard to many indoor
public places." Id. at 809.
208. See Finkin, supra note 165. Finkin states succinctly, "[tihe inescapable conclu-
sion is that what the law of intrusion actually regulates is not privacy, but out-
rage. The law protects freedom from emotional distress, not freedom of
informational control." Id. at 228. (citation omitted).
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A robust legal commitment to privacy would recognize that all the above pred-
icate conditions are invasive to be surveilled [sic] by a hidden camera wher-
ever one sits, to have one's desk rifled for whatever is read, to be questioned
about one's private affairs however seemingly trivial and it would then re-
quire a showing of a specific business need sufficient to overcome that intru-
sion, which condition may or may not have been satisfied in these cases. But
such is not the law.2 0 9
Some writers have suggested codes of privacy.2 10 That idea is be-
yond the scope of this paper. However, we believe that it merits seri-
ous further research. One obvious advantage of such an approach
would be to level the current privacy inequity between public sector
workers and private sector workers. Another advantage would be to
disconnect the law of privacy from the declining American norms of
civility. Our tentative proposal would be to examine and move toward
advocating creation of a federal worker's bill of rights, predicated upon
the Commerce Clause 21 1 that, among other things, would:
(a) guarantee employment termination only for good cause af-
ter a probationary period of six months;2 12
(b) limit drug testing to safety-sensitive positions, security-sen-
sitive positions, and for good cause;
(c) limit searches of employee desks, lockers, lunch buckets,
and automobiles to situations where legitimate business reasons
outweigh the invasion;
(d) require all monitoring of employees be with both notice to
employees and consent of employees; and
(e) include speech protections for employees with exceptions
only for disloyal, disruptive, insubordinate, and legally unpro-
tected types of speech.
Otherwise, the tendency of the law of privacy to decline in tandem
with the declining American civility standards combined with the lop-
sided power granted employers by the employment-at-will rule will
continue to rob American workers of their human dignity. Our review
of the state of privacy laws in Germany, Canada, and the European
Community suggests that those countries lead the United States in
protecting privacy, mainly because of national concern and legislation.
We believe that in the near term American workers will continue to
209. See id. at 228-29.
210. See, e.g., Kevin J. Conlon, Privacy in the Workplace, LAB. L.J., Aug. 1997, at 444,
447-48 (suggesting an eight point list of legislative reforms to protect employee
privacy in the workplace; Yamada, supra note 180, at 58 (listing a Model Private
Employee Free Speech Statute); Kevin J. Baum, Comment: E-Mail in the Work-
place and The Right to Privacy, 42 VILL. L. REv. 1011, 1036-40 (1997) (discussing
considerations and provisions that should be in any e-mail monitoring policy).
211. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
212. MODEL EMPLYMEPNT TERMINATION AcT § 3 (1991) (proposing a one-year waiting
period before an employee is entitled to protection of "good-causeP standard).
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increase their use of the judiciary to try to establish meaningful pro-
tections against the incivility and outrageous invasions of privacy that
they encounter in the workplace. However, until and unless there is
meaningful law reform, American workers will be forced to choose be-
tween their dignity and their economic well being.
